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INTRODUCTION 
Piracy has been at the heart of the formation of international law at every 
major stage of its development.  Indeed, many of the most basic doctrines 
of international law have been formed either around piracy specifically or 
with piracy in mind.  The reason for this is quite simple:  piracy occurs on 
the high seas, outside the sovereign territory of any state, such that national 
laws alone do not apply to piratical acts outside a nation’s territory.1  
                                                          
 *  Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B., 1994, 
Princeton University; J.D., M.A., University of Michigan, 1999.  For their invaluable 
assistance with this article, thanks to Julie Noland and historical researcher extraordinaire 
Dr. Michael Mounter.  Dino Pournaras and Sarah VanWye merit particular praise for their 
assistance in all aspects of this article.  Any shortcomings are the responsibility of the author 
alone. 
 1. Dr. Maria Jacobsson, Alternate Head of Delegation of Sweden on behalf of the 
European Union, Statement in Discussion Panel B at United Nations:   Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery at Sea (May 10, 2001), in 2 TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 471 (Yonah 
Alexander & Tyler B. Richardson eds., 2009) (“Piracy is an international crime that by 
definition can only be committed outside of the territory of a state.”); Anthony J. Colangelo, 
Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:   Terrorism and the Intersection of 
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Furthermore, pirates do not generally target any single nation or individual; 
instead, they attack the vessels of any nation.2  Thus, in the absence of 
international law, pirates would be able to run (or sail) free and clear of 
legal obligations.  This Article seeks to take the resurgence of piracy over 
the past several years as an invitation to revisit the role piracy has played in 
the formation of American law, specifically with regard to its incorporation 
of international law into domestic law.3 
This Article will focus on two related lines of historical inquiry.  First, 
this Article explores the Acts of the Continental Congress and the states in 
the early years of the American Republic to understand how piracy 
influenced early American lawmaking.  This Article then traces the 
                                                          
National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 144 (2007) (describing how 
pirates “brought themselves outside of any state’s specific jurisdiction, and were instead 
subject to the ‘law of nations,’ which all states could enforce without fear of trading on any 
other state’s sovereignty”); Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates 
Under the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 11–13 (2008) (noting 
that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has defined piracy as, inter alia, 
an act “committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state”).  
Indeed, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea includes explicit language 
intended to combat this threat.  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 
101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 2. Moreover, those vessels are generally vulnerable and convenient targets.  More than 
eighty percent of cargo worldwide is transported on the seas, and yet those same waters are 
patrolled and regulated far less than land or even air.  See Gal Luft & Anne Korin, 
Terrorism Goes to Sea, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 61, 62 (2004). 
 3. See 1 TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that piracy in East 
Africa and Nigeria has grown significantly, and while complete statistics are not available, 
“some of the incidents have been spectacular”); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal 
Deterrence at Sea:   A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6 (2007) (recognizing the growing reemergence of piracy and 
arguing that positive international law and customary international law are sufficient to 
counter it); Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists:   Piracy in the 21st Century, 4 
REGENT J. INT’L L. 17, 17 (2006) (“Despite the perception that pirates have been relegated to 
history with its muskets and the Spanish Main, maritime piracy remains a significant threat 
to international commerce and security.”); Timothy H. Goodman, “Leaving the Corsair’s 
Name to Other Times:”  How to Enforce the Law of Sea Piracy in the 21st Century Through 
Regional International Agreements, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 139, 153 (1999) 
(recognizing that even though piracy statistics indicate that pirates are flourishing, these 
numbers are likely to be grossly underreported due to a fear of increased insurance 
premiums, delayed shipments, and loss of clients); James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The 
Pirates of the Gulf of Aden:   The Coalition Is the Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243, 245 
(2009) (claiming that the “audacity and scope” of attacks by Somali pirates are 
unprecedented to the point that researchers have noted that “[w]e have never seen this 
before, these kinds of numbers, the number of ships that have been attacked” (internal 
citation omitted)); Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere):   Why More 
is Needed, FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468021 (stating that while piracy decreased for most of the 
twentieth century, it resurfaced at the end of that century and the start of the current one and 
arguing that pirates should be treated as terrorists); Mark McDonald, For Somali Pirates, 
2009 Is a Record Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/africa/30piracy.html?_r=1 (“Somali pirates 
carried out a record number of attacks and hijackings in 2009, despite the deployment of 
international warships to thwart them and a United Nations Security Council resolution to 
bring the fight against them to shore.”). 
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treatment of piracy between the signing of the Declaration of Independence 
and the sweeping Judiciary Act of 1789, a period largely unexplored in 
academic literature.  The decisions by the Framers of the Constitution with 
regard to piracy and its relationship with domestic law, as well as 
international law (the law of nations), were largely informed by state 
legislation from 1776 to 1789.4  As such, that period necessarily offers 
important insights into how piracy has framed American law.  Second, the 
Article looks at the role that piracy played in the formation of American 
law with regard to core concepts of international law, such as the 
responsibility of individual actors, sovereignty of states, and universal 
jurisdiction (i.e., the power to exercise jurisdiction for particularly heinous 
crimes).5 
The roots of piracy date back more than a millennium.6  The term 
“pirate,” derived from the Latin pirata and Greek peirates,7 appeared in 
Greek literature as early as 140 B.C.8  Acts of piracy have resulted in legal 
procedures for nearly as long.  For example, the Roman Republic’s Senate 
passed a law in 68 B.C. to commission Pompey the Great to subdue the 
pirates’ “sovereignty” with Roman sovereignty,9 and Cicero wrote that 
oaths to pirates ought not be legally kept as pirates are enemies of all 
mankind (hostis humani generis).10  In the late fifteenth century, beginning 
                                                          
 4. See infra Part II (detailing the legislative reactions of several states to acts of 
piracy). 
 5. See generally PRINCETON UNIV., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION 28 (2001) (defining universal jurisdiction as applying “based solely on the 
nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the 
state exercising such jurisdiction”). 
 6. For a broad-ranging, if somewhat scattered, treatment of many early examples of 
piracy and the responses to it, see A. T. Whatley, Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy, 
 3 LAW MAG. & REV. 536 (1874). 
 7. ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 1 (2d. ed. 1998). 
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id. at 10; 1 TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 1, at 9. 
 10. Rubin, supra note 7, at 17; see also ALFRED S. BRADFORD, FLYING THE BLACK 
FLAG:   A BRIEF HISTORY OF PIRACY 44 (2007) (recounting Cicero’s stance that pirates are 
criminals not protected by the laws of war).  This concept developed in a time when the 
Mediterranean was far from safe and piracy was common.  ANGUS KONSTAM, PIRACY:   THE 
COMPLETE HISTORY 13 (2008).  However, the reaction to piracy was not uniform.  Id.  In 
ancient Greece, some city-states encouraged piracy, while others, such as Athens, fought 
pirates to keep trade routes clear.  Id.  It has been argued that piracy was generally accepted 
and that attempts to curb piracy by Athens could be seen as half-hearted.  PHILIP DE SOUZA, 
PIRACY IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD 39–40 (1999).  The island of Crete served as a 
pirate base for almost eight centuries.  KONSTAM, supra, at 13.  Attempts by anti-piracy city-
states never managed to fully curb the threat of pirate raids.  Id.  When a growing Rome 
expanded into the eastern Mediterranean, it became a target of pirate raids.  Id. at 15.  In 
approximately 100 B.C., the Roman Senate acted and passed a law forbidding entry of any 
pirate ships into its ports, and ordered allied kingdoms to guarantee that no pirates would 
use their territory as a base.  DE SOUZA, supra, at 110–11; RALPH WARD, PIRATES IN 
HISTORY 39 (1974).  The law was ineffective and merely led the pirates to consolidate their 
forces.  DE SOUZA, supra, at 114.  
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with the Spanish expulsion of the Moors in 1492, European states and their 
merchant vessels were under constant threat from Moorish pirates.11  Piracy 
also led to early instances of cooperation between States, as in the late 
sixteenth century when “merchant shipping in the Mediterranean had 
become so perilous . . . that all the nations of Europe banded together” to 
combat piracy.12  The stakes involved in the control of trade routes and the 
transport of vast wealth by merchant vessels provided compelling reasons 
for States, individually and collectively, to combat the actions of pirates. 
Since its earliest days, the United States has also taken direct action to 
combat piracy.  Indeed, the first successful campaign by the United States 
beyond its borders was a war triggered by piracy.13  The Barbary Wars, 
waged in the early nineteenth century against the Barbary States of North 
Africa (modern-day Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) sought to stem 
pirate attacks originating from those territories against merchant ships 
(including American ships) in the Mediterranean Sea.14 
The early examples of international efforts to combat piracy demonstrate 
not only the threat posed by pirates but also the recognition by international 
actors that in the absence of a body of international law, pirates could 
engage in otherwise illegal behavior without any threat of punishment.15  In 
the face of the unique problems of illegal activity in a territory controlled 
by no individual state (the high seas), the community of nations worked 
together to craft a body of law to criminalize and punish pirates. 
Again, just as piracy has been at the center of international legal reform, 
it has been an important part of domestic law in the United States.  In an 
early piracy case, the Supreme Court explained why piracy, which it had 
earlier described as “only a sea term for robbery,”16 is forbidden by the law 
of nations, while robbery is not.17  The Court noted: “A pirate is deemed, 
and properly deemed, hostis humani generis.  But why is he so deemed?  
Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all 
nations, without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public 
authority.”18  Whereas foreign states developed responses to piracy through 
                                                          
 11. See SEYMOUR GATES POND, TRUE ADVENTURES OF PIRATES 5–7 (1954); see also  
1 TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 1, at 9. 
 12. POND, supra note 11, at 15. 
 13. See Terence Fokas, Comment, The Barbary Coast Revisited:   The Resurgence of 
International Maritime Piracy, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 427, 427–28 (1997). 
 14. See generally Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on Terror:   The 
Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 122–24 (2003) 
(chronicling the history of the Barbary Wars and drawing a parallel to the modern American 
war against terrorism). 
 15. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (recognizing that 
piratical offenses depend upon the law of nations rather than any municipal code). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844). 
 18. Id. 
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both international and domestic mechanisms over many centuries, the 
fledgling American republic addressed piracy only after a robust body of 
international law existed.  As a result, the United States was presented with 
both a challenge and an opportunity: how to mix existing international law 
with developing domestic law in the effort to combat piracy. 
This Article traces the role of piracy in American jurisprudence to 
identify how the unique characteristics of piracy have helped to shape the 
intersection of domestic law and international law.  Piracy has been 
addressed in all of the major mechanisms of American lawmaking.  Indeed, 
piracy was explicitly addressed in the Constitution, which authorizes 
Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”19 
Part I of this Article explores legislation at the national and state levels in 
the decade-plus between the signing of the Declaration of Independence 
and the Judiciary Act of 1789, identifying several important developments 
in American law triggered by the need to address piracy as a special body 
of law.  Part II focuses on the judiciary, analyzing early cases at the federal 
and state levels to see how the courts implemented legislative mandates 
regarding piracy.  During this early period of American history, courts 
actively relied on international law in framing their decisions on piracy, 
and this reliance lies at the heart of the relationship between domestic law 
and international law in the United States.  This Part explores how those 
early cases have influenced modern American law in several specific areas.  
The Article concludes that piracy played a pivotal role in establishing the 
place (and indeed the importance) of international law in applying domestic 
law to a category of cases that otherwise defied solutions—crimes on the 
high seas.  The role of piracy has been obscured by the passage of time, but 
it endures through a robust body of law in the human rights arena that has 
grown in perhaps unexpected and certainly unnoticed directions out of 
legislation and case law designed to effectively define and punish piracy. 
I. PIRACY AND LEGAL REFORM LEADING UP TO THE JUDICIARY ACT 
In order to understand the role of piracy in shaping American law, one 
must go back to the earliest efforts of the fledgling Republic to address the 
issue.  In the years immediately following independence, several states 
adopted their own laws on piracy.  For instance, in 1776, South Carolina 
passed: 
                                                          
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  For an excellent discussion of the scope and role of 
this clause, see generally Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the 
Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2009).  
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An Act to empower the Court of Admiralty to have Jurisdiction in all 
Cases of Capture of the Ships and other Vessels of the Inhabitants of 
Great Britain, Ireland, the British West Indies, Nova Scotia, and East 
and West Florida; to establish the Trial by Jury in the Court of Admiralty 
in Cases of Capture, and for the other Purposes therein mentioned.20   
Likewise, in 1779, Connecticut passed “An Act, impowering [sic] the 
Superior Court, to try and determine Piracies, Felonies and Robberies 
committed on the High-Seas, &c.”21  The Act provided that “all Piracies, 
Felonies and Robberies committed in or upon the Sea, or in any Place 
within the Admiralty Jurisdiction,” should be tried in Superior Court in any 
County in the State “in the same Manner as in Case of Felonies committed 
on the Land, within the Jurisdiction of this State.”22  Thus, the Connecticut 
Act of 1779 treated piracy as a crime comparable to domestic felonies and 
authorized its state courts to proceed against pirates for crimes on the high 
seas as if they had been committed on land in Connecticut. 
In Rhode Island, the legislature passed a law in September 1779, entitled 
“An Act empowering the Superior Court of Judicature . . . to take 
Cognizance of all Acts of Piracy and Felony committed upon the high 
Sea.”23  The Rhode Island legislature explained the need for its immediate 
and unilateral action as follows: “[w]hereas Acts of Piracy and Felony 
have, of late, been frequently perpetrated; and since this State hath become 
independent of the Kingdom of Great-Britain, no Court hath been 
appointed and authorized to take Cognizance thereof.”24  The Act provided 
that “all Acts of Piracy and Felony committed upon the high Sea, where the 
Offenders shall come or be brought within this State, shall be cognizable 
before the Superior Court of Judicature, Court of Assize and General Gaol-
Delivery, at any of their stated Terms, in any County within this State.”25  
                                                          
 20. Act of April 11, 1776, microformed on SESSION LAWS OF THE AMERICAN STATES 
AND TERRITORIES, South Carolina 1776–1899, Fiche 1 (Redgrave Info. Res. Corp.).  South 
Carolina’s early and continued efforts to enact laws on piracy may reflect the importance of 
maritime trade to the State and the State’s willingness to engage in privateering as 
authorized by the Constitution.  See Fifield v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 47 Pa. 
166 (1864) (affirming the lower court judgment dismissing petitioner’s claim against the 
insurance company because the insured ship was not taken by “pirates,” but by privateers, 
which was not a covered loss under the policy).  In fact, John Adams wrote that “South 
Carolina Seems to display, a Spirit of Enterprize in Trade, Superiour to any other State . . . .  
They have some Privateers, and have made several Prizes.”  Letter from John Adams to 
James Warren (Apr. 6, 1777), in 5 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 145 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1983).   
 21. CONNECTICUT PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS 537, microformed on SESSION LAWS OF THE 
AMERICAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 1775–1899, Connecticut, Fiche 2 (Redgrave Info. Res. 
Corp.).  
 22. Id. 
 23. RHODE ISLAND STATUTE LAWS 16, microformed on SESSION LAWS OF THE 
AMERICAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 1775–1899, Rhode Island, Fiche 11 (Redgrave Info. 
Res. Corp.).  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Piracy trials were to have the same course of proceedings as “Trials, at 
common Law, for Felonies, high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”26  The Rhode 
Island statute provided an interesting caveat that “no Sentence of Death 
shall be executed, until the Case be laid before the General Assembly; 
which shall be done at the next succeeding Session after Trial.”27 
Similarly, a Pennsylvania statute for “regulating and establishing 
Admiralty Jurisdiction” from 1780 provided that: 
[I]n all cases of prize, capture or re-capture upon the water from 
enemies, or by way of reprisal, or from pirates, the same shall be tried, 
adjudged and determined . . . by the Law of Nations and the Acts and 
Ordinances of the Honorable the Congress of the United States of 
America.28 
The statute went on to describe the specifics of trials for pirates, which 
were substantially similar to the provisions adopted by Congress the 
following year.  The Pennsylvania Act states that: 
[A]ll traitors, pirates, felons and criminals, who shall offend upon the sea 
or within the Admiralty jurisdiction, shall be . . . tried and 
judged . . . according to the course of the common Law, in like manner 
as if the treason, felony or crime were committed within one of the 
counties of this State.”29 
The Act underscores the severity of the crime of piracy in its description 
of the appropriate punishment for a commander or master of a ship who 
turns pirate or yields his ship up voluntarily to a pirate or enemy: “he shall 
be adjudged to be a pirate, felon and robber; and being convicted 
thereof . . . shall have and suffer such pains of death, loss of lands, goods 
and chattels, as pirates, felons and robbers upon the seas ought to have and 
suffer.”30 
                                                          
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Act for Regulating and Establishing Admiralty Jurisdiction, ch. CLII, in THE ACTS 
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 313–14 (Dunlap 
ed., 1776), microformed on SESSION LAWS OF THE AMERICAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 
1775–1899, Pennsylvania Commonwealth, Fiche 5 (Redgrave Res. Info. Corp.).   
 29. Id. at 317.  New Jersey adopted a statute one year later that mirrored almost 
verbatim the Pennsylvania statute.  Act for Regulating and Establishing Admiralty 
Jurisdiction, ch. VII, in ACTS OF THE SIXTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW 
JERSEY 13, 19–20 (Isaac Collins ed., 1782), microformed on SESSION LAWS OF THE 
AMERICAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 1775–1899, New Jersey, Fiche 7 (Redgrave Info. Res. 
Corp.).   
 30. A Supplement to the Act entitled, “An ACT for regulating and establishing 
Admiralty Jurisdiction,” ch. CLXXX, in THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 28, at 386.  The New Jersey statute 
included provisions for “the Trial of Pirates and other Sea Felons” in sections 15 through 18 
of the Act.  Act for regulating and establishing Admiralty Jurisdiction, supra note 29, at 19–
20.  Section 15 provides a brief history of how piracy cases were tried before the Act was 
passed, noting especially that pirates were not tried by juries during the colonial period.  Id. 
at 19.  By contrast, the Act instituted trial by jury in piracy cases.  Id.  The language in 
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Even as several states were enacting their own legislation on piracy, the 
federal legislature was trying to develop a unified national plan for 
combating piracy.  Article 9, section 1 of the Articles of Confederation, 
approved for ratification in 1777 and officially ratified by the states in 
1781, provided that Congress was to “have the sole and exclusive 
right . . . [and] States shall be restrained from . . . appointing courts for the 
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing 
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of 
captures.”31 
Per Article 9, on March 17, 1781, a congressional “committee [was] 
appointed to devise the mode of appointing courts for the trial of piracies 
and felonies committed on the high seas.”32  On April 5, 1781, the 
committee presented a draft of a bill for establishing courts for the trial of 
piracy and Congress agreed to an ordinance outlining the procedures for 
creating such courts.33  The ordinance declared that persons committing 
piracy or felony on the high seas should be tried according to common law 
courts as if the piracy or felony had been committed on land.34  The 
ordinance provided that these cases were to be judged by “the justices of 
the supreme or superior courts of judicature, and judge of the Court of 
Admiralty of the . . . states.”35   
This ordinance outlines the delicate federal-state balance of the 
immediate post-independence period.36  The ordinance also details the 
ways in which the early Republic grappled with how to combat piracy and 
how (and whether) to adopt international legal norms into domestic law.37  
The ordinance called on the states to use their own common law for the 
substantive crimes and causes of action to be brought against those accused 
of piracy.38  However, the states were encouraged to create special courts to 
handle these cases, recognizing the unique nature of piracy and thus 
opening the door for a separate body of law to develop for piracy cases.39 
A letter dated April 10, 1781, from James Lovell to Elbridge Gerry 
explained the arrangement of judges for the piracy courts and stated that: 
                                                          
sections 15 through 18 of this Act resembles the language used in sections 18 and 20 of the 
March 8, 1780, Pennsylvania Act and sections 2 through 4 of the September 22, 1780, 
Pennsylvania Act, suggesting that New Jersey borrowed its language from its neighbor. 
 31. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9, § 1. 
 32. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 274 (Gaillard Hunt ed., Gov’t 
Printing Office 1912) (1781). 
 33. Id. at 354–56. 
 34. Id. at 354. 
 35. Id. at 355. 
 36. See id. at 354–55 (granting Congress the sole and exclusive power of appointing 
courts to try piracies but allowing states to apply their own common law). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 354 (encouraging states to speedily create piracy courts). 
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Congress have determined that the superior Judges in each State with the 
Judge of Admiralty (or such one of the Judges of Admiralty where there 
are several as the Executive shall chuse [sic] to commissionate) shall be 
Judges for trying Piracies on the high Seas; any two or more to be a 
Quorum.  The Tryals [sic] were to be under all the Forms of prosecuting 
such Crimes on Land by grand & petit Juries.40 
After a report to Congress on February 4, 1783, explaining that the 
Legislature of Pennsylvania found the piracy courts ordinance to be so 
obscure “that they were at a loss to adapt their laws to it,” a committee was 
appointed to amend the ordinance.41  The ordinance was subsequently 
amended on March 4, 1783, to clarify which judges were to preside over 
the court.42 
It appears that there were continued imperfections with Congress’ 
approach to mandating that the states try piracy under their common law.  
On September 6, 1785, South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney43 made a 
motion before Congress expressing the opinion that “similar crimes should 
be punished in a similar manner,” and that the “Ordinance of April, 1781, 
respecting the punishment of piracies and felonies has a different operation 
in some of the States.”44  Following Pinckney’s recommendation, on 
September 6, 1785, a resolution was made directing John Jay, the Secretary 
of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, to institute 
courts that would punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas in 
the same manner in all the states.45  The motion notes that at that point in 
time, different states punished piracy differently per their interpretations of 
the 1781 ordinance.46  The September 1785 resolution underscored the 
importance of legislating against piracy, stating that “it has been the policy 
of all civilized nations to punish crimes so dangerous to the welfare and 
                                                          
 40. Letter from James Lovell to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 10, 1781), in 17 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 141 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1990) (emphasis in original). 
 41. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 888–89 (Gaillard Hunt ed., Gov’t 
Printing Office 1922) (1783). 
 42. 24 id. at 164.  The following language was removed:   “[T]he Judge of the Court of 
Admiralty, or, in case there shall be several judges of the said court in the state where the 
trials hereafter mentioned are to be had, any one of such judges, to be commissioned for that 
purpose by the supreme executive power of such State, and the justices of the supreme or 
superior court of judicature of the several and respective states, or any two, or more, of 
them, (of whom the said Judge of the Admiralty shall always be one.”  Id. 
 43. A committee that included Pinckney drafted Article 19, an amendment to the 
Articles of Confederation that would have created a federal court to handle cases of treason, 
mis-prison of treason, and piracy or felony on the high seas, and put it before Congress on 
August 7, 1786.  31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 497–98 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1934) (1786). 
 44. Id. at 682.   
 45. Id. at 682, 797–806. 
 46. Id. at 682. 
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destructive to the intercourse and Confidence of Society . . . in an 
exemplary manner.”47 
In response to that resolution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs reported 
back to the Congress on September 29, 1785.48  While the Secretary agreed 
that “Piracy is War against all mankind, which is the highest Violation of 
the Laws of Nations,” he argued that Congress did not in fact have the 
power “to declare what is or shall be Felony or Piracy, . . . but merely to 
appoint Courts for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas.”49  Nevertheless, the Secretary reasoned “that Congress would 
not exceed their Powers by ordaining, the Punishment to be inflicted 
throughout the United States in Cases of Piracy,” and proceeded to lay out 
an exceedingly detailed “Ordinance for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies 
Committed on the High Seas” to replace the 1781 ordinance.50  Ultimately, 
Jay’s draft ordinance was not passed, and no action appears to have been 
taken on the proposed amendment.51 
Several states followed the Congressional mandate laid out in the Piracy 
Ordinance.  Massachusetts, for one, established piracy courts in 1783 in 
response to the ordinance.52  The Massachusetts Act was entitled “An Act 
for carrying into Execution an Ordinance of Congress for establishing 
Courts for the Trial of Felonies and Piracies Committed on the High 
Seas.”53  The Act describes in detail which judges were to preside over the 
piracy courts, where the piracy courts were to be held, and the mode for 
appointing jurors.54  The Act provided that: 
[T]he Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court and the Judge of Admiralty 
of this Commonwealth, or any two of them, are constituted and 
appointed Judges for hearing and trying every Person charged with 
                                                          
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 797. 
 49. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 50. Id. at 798–804. 
 51. Letter from Charles Thomson to William Samuel Johnson (May 16, 1789), in 25 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, at 525–26.  
 52. Act of Feb. 25, 1783, ch. X, reprinted in 1782–83 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 216–17 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1890), microformed on SESSION LAWS 
OF THE AMERICAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 1775–1899, Massachusetts Commonwealth, 
Fiche 3 (Redgrave Info. Res. Group).  Massachusetts had established its first maritime court 
as early as 1775 to exercise jurisdiction in prize matters.  2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 
353 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, eds., 1965).  Several years after establishing the 
1783 court, Massachusetts passed a resolution dealing with the fate of two pirates who had 
been found guilty of piracy and faced a death sentence.  See “Resolve on the Petition of 
Richard Squire and John Matthews, Authorizing the Justices of the Court Appointed for the 
Trial of Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas, to Sentence Said Convicts to Hard Labour, 
and not to Pass Sentence of Death,” reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
supra, at 882–83. 
 53. See ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 52, at 216. 
 54. Id. 
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Piracy or Felony upon the High Seas . . . by Grand and Petit Jurors, 
according to the Course of the Common Law.55 
The Act further stated that “the Times and Places for holding Courts, for 
the Trial of Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas, shall be . . . 
held and kept in the said several Counties, and at such other Time and 
Place in any Maritime Town.”56 
The South Carolina legislature actively sought solutions to combat 
piracy.  On February 29, 1785, South Carolina Governor William Moultrie, 
in a message to the General Assembly, transmitted a letter he had received 
from Don Vincent Emanuel De Lespedes, the Spanish Governor of East 
Florida, concerning a pirate gang operating along the coast, and included a 
deposition of a captured pirate named Thomas Bell.57  The South Carolina 
House of Representatives offered a reward of fifty guineas to anyone who 
could apprehend the pirates mentioned in the Spanish governor’s letters, 
payable upon their conviction.58  On March 11, 1785, Governor Moultrie 
notified the South Carolina House of Representatives that one of the pirates 
had been captured and taken to jail, but South Carolina Justices Henry 
Pendleton and Aedanus Burke and Admiralty Court Judge and South 
Carolina Attorney General William Drayton were of the opinion that the 
Act of Congress made for the Trial of Pirates was inadequate for that 
purpose.59  Governor Moultrie provided the South Carolina House with 
copies of the opinions and asked that measures be taken to remedy the 
situation in the future.60  On March 24, 1785, the South Carolina House 
passed a resolution requesting that Governor Moultrie transmit the papers, 
including the judges’ opinions, to the South Carolina delegates for them to 
put before the Continental Congress for a remedy.61 
In January 1788, the South Carolina House of Representatives appointed 
a committee “[t]o bring in An Ordinance to carry into effect that part of the 
Ninth Article of the Confederation and the Act of Congress relative to the 
Trial of Piracies and other offences therein Specified, Committed on the 
                                                          
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Letter from Don Vincent Emanuel De Lespedes, Gov. of East Florida, to William 
Moultrie, Gov. of South Carolina, transmitted to South Carolina House of Representatives 
(Feb. 19, 1785), available at 
http://www.archivesindex.sc.gov/onlinearchives/Thumbnails.aspx?recordId=284163 
 58. See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1785–1786, at 134, 144 (Lark 
Emerson Adams, ed., 1979).   
 59. See id. at 219 (declining to further specify why the Act of Congress was 
inadequate).  
 60. See id. at 219–20 (“doubt[ing] not” that the House would indeed rectify the 
problem). 
 61. Id. at 292. 
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High Seas,” based on the 1781 and 1783 ordinances of Congress.62  The 
bill was introduced on January 25, 1788 and passed on February 27, 
1788.63  This law established piracy courts in response to Congress 
mandate and was entitled “An Act to carry into effect the Ordinances of 
Congress for establishing Courts for Trial of Piracy and Felonies 
committed on the High Seas.”64  The South Carolina Act references the 
ordinances of Congress of April 5, 1781, and the amended version of 
March 4, 1783, and provides that: 
[W]here any person . . . shall hereafter commit any piracy or felony on 
the high seas . . . and have been or shall be brought into this state for 
trial, the . . . jurors . . . shall enquire of, try and adjudge every such 
offender, in such a manner as if the offence had been . . . committed 
within the said district.65 
Other states, like Maryland, did not address piracy on the high seas, but 
did address piracy on navigable waters within the state (behavior that 
would not constitute piracy in the modern day as it did not occur on the 
high seas).  On November 7, 1785, Maryland’s General Assembly passed: 
 An ACT to approve, confirm and ratify, the compact made by the 
commissioners appointed by the general assembly of the commonwealth 
of Virginia, and the commissioners appointed by this state, to regulate 
and settle the jurisdiction and navigation of Patowmack and Pocomoke 
rivers, and that part of Chesapeake bay which lieth within the territory of 
Virginia.66 
The tenth provision of the compact between the two states provided for 
piracies committed along the rivers at certain points and in the Chesapeake 
Bay to be tried in Virginia and Maryland state courts, depending upon 
which state had jurisdiction.67  The method for determining jurisdiction was 
detailed in the compact.68   
                                                          
 62. JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1787–1788, at 317 (Michael E. 
Stevens, ed. 1981). 
 63. Id. at 356, 498, 512. 
 64. 1788 S.C. Acts 20, microformed on SESSION LAWS OF AMERICAN STATES AND 
TERRITORIES 1775–1899, South Carolina, Fiche 10 (Redgrave Information Resources 
Corp.).  
 65. Id. (clarifying that piracy courts were to be considered as serious as other courts by 
noting that jurors who did not fulfill their duties would be subject to fines and penalties, as 
they would in other courts). 
 66. 1785 Md. Laws, ch. 1, microformed on SESSION LAWS OF AMERICAN STATES AND 
TERRITORIES1775–1899, Maryland, Fiche 14 (Redgrave Information Resources Corp.). 
 67. See id.  The acts defined as piracy in the compact between Maryland and Virginia 
would not be considered piracy today, as they could not occur on the high seas but rather 
within territorial waters shared by the two states within the territory of the United States. 
 68. See id. (considering water within the territorial bounds of either state to belong to 
that state, with the Patowmack River being a common highway for both states to utilize). 
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The Virginia General Assembly passed a similar law in October of that 
same year, codifying its agreement with Maryland.69  At its October 1785 
session, the Virginia General Assembly also passed “An act to prevent 
losses by pirates, enemies, and others, on the high seas.”70  This Act set 
forth the procedures for admiralty courts to use in determining 
compensations in cases where officers or seamen were killed or wounded 
in defense of a ship against pirates or other enemies.71 The law understood 
that the admiralty court would have jurisdiction over any cases of piracy 
occurring on the high seas.72 
At its October 1786 session, the Virginia General Assembly passed “An 
act concerning treasons, felonies, and other offences committed out of the 
jurisdiction of this commonwealth.”73  This act gave the general courts of 
Virginia counties the authority to try cases of treason and other felonies 
“except piracies and felonies on the high seas,” which were committed “by 
any citizen of this commonwealth, in any place out of the jurisdiction of the 
courts of common law in this commonwealth, and all felonies committed 
by citizen against citizen in any such place.”74  This act, coupled with the 
1785 acts of the Virginia legislature, confirmed that cases of piracy on the 
high seas would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty courts. 
In 1787, New York enacted legislation to clarify the role of its courts of 
admiralty.75  The New York Act was designed to make clear “[t]hat the 
court of admiralty of this State shall not meddle or hold plea of any thing 
done within this State, but only of things done upon the sea, as it hath 
formerly been used,” except in the case of “death of any person and of 
maihem [sic] done in ships or vessels being and hovering in the main 
stream of great rivers out of the body of any county, or nigh to the sea, and 
in none other places of the same rivers . . . .”76 
                                                          
 69. See Act of Oct. 10, 1785, 1785 Va. Acts 50, 52–53 (specifying that piracy occurring 
between two points on the Chesapeake Bay and the Potowmack River against citizens of 
Virginia, by people who were not citizens of Maryland, would be tried in Virginia). 
 70. Id. at 167.   
 71. See id. at 167–68 (giving courts discretion to levy reasonable fines against the 
pirates, as long as the killed or wounded seamen actually attempted to defend the ship). 
 72. See id. at 167 (noting masters and seamen submitted petitions to admiralty judges). 
 73. Id. at 330. 
 74. Id. at 330–31. 
 75. Act to prevent encroachments of the court of admiralty, 1787 N.Y. Laws 394. 
 76. See id. (emphasis in original) (clarifying further that all matters involving both land 
and water also fell outside the admiralty court’s jurisdiction). 
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II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN DEVELOPING LAW THROUGH PIRACY 
CASES AND THE IMPACT OF THOSE CASES ON MODERN AMERICAN  
LEGAL DOCTRINES 
Although constitutionally the legislature is responsible for laying the 
ground rules for criminal and civil piracy cases, courts have played the 
dominant role in shaping the impact of piracy on other areas of the law.  
Notably, piracy cases were among the first cases to address the relationship 
between international law and domestic law in the United States, at both 
the state and federal levels. 
A. The Early Cases 
The earliest published federal court case involving piracy, United States 
v. Tully,77 demonstrates the federal courts’ codification and expansion of 
the crime of piracy with reference to the law of nations.  In that 1812 
Massachusetts case, two American crewmen were charged with piracy after 
running away with a ship and ending up in St. Lucia.78  The court discussed 
whether force was a necessary element of the crime of piracy and reasoned 
that, according to the law of nations, “[a] pirate is one . . . who, to enrich 
himself, either by surprise or force, sets upon merchants or other traders, by 
sea, to spoil them of their goods.”79  In contrast, the court noted that 
“[p]iracy, by the common law, consists in committing those acts of robbery 
and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed on shore, would 
amount to felony there.”80  The court went on to conclude that the statute, 
while “analogous to the common law description[,] . . .  ma[d]e certain 
other acts piracy, which would not be so at common law,” including breach 
of trust committed “piratically and feloniously.”81  In other words, the court 
acknowledged that the statute expanded the crime of piracy beyond the 
common law definition, which corresponded with piracy as understood by 
the law of nations. 
In its first decision addressing piracy, the Supreme Court took a narrow 
view of piracy and the scope of the 1790 Act for the Punishment of certain 
Crimes against the United States.82  In United States v. Palmer,83 Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated: 
                                                          
 77. 28 F. Cas. 226 (C.C. Mass. 1812). 
 78. Id. at 228. 
 79. Id. at 229. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); An Act for the Punishment 
of Certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).  In this Act by the 
First Congress, piracy was defined as the commission of certain acts, prohibited by domestic 
laws, that occur “upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular state.”  Id. at 113.  These prohibited acts include “murder or 
robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the 
SAMUELS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2010  9:41:54 AM 
2010] EFFECT OF PIRACY ON AMERICAN LAW 1245 
[T]he crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas, on 
board of any ship . . . belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign 
state . . . is not a piracy within the true intent and meaning of the act for 
the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.84 
According to this reasoning, the Court found that because the crime of 
robbery was not punishable by death on land, robbery committed on the 
high seas was likewise not punishable by death.85 
On March 3, 1819, Congress again enacted legislation regarding the 
prohibition of piracy, but it defined piracy in a different manner.86  Rather 
than relating piracy to violations of domestic laws, the 1819 Act explicitly 
defined piracy with reference to the law of nations: 
[I]f any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit 
the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender 
or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or found in the United 
States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, 
before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he 
or they may be brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be 
punished with death.87 
The legislative history for the 1819 Act is sparse, but Edwin Dickinson, 
writing in the Harvard Law Review a century after the Act, opined: 
From [Palmer] it was only natural to infer that the Supreme Court 
regarded Section 8 as exclusively a statutory definition of piracy by the 
municipal law of the United States, not including provisions for the trial 
and punishment in United States courts of pirates by the law of nations. 
Thus interpreted, however, the decision in United States v. Palmer would 
have limited much the scope and efficacy of this section.  The decision 
was not well received.  That it left the law with respect to piracy more 
restricted than it had been supposed to be was made evident when 
Congress promptly enacted a new statute, the Act of March 3, 1819, to 
supply the omission which the Supreme Court had discovered.88 
The 1819 Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish 
the Crime of Piracy set forth that “if any person or persons whatsoever, 
shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of 
                                                          
laws of the United States be punishable with death.”  Id. at 113–14.  The Act further lists 
scenarios that would qualify as piratical acts under the legislation, such as the revolt of 
seamen against their captain or the voluntary yielding of a vessel to pirates.  See id. at 114. 
 83. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). 
 84. Id. at 633–34. 
 85. Id. at 627. 
 86. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of 
Piracy, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510 (1819).  
 87. See id. (concluding that convicted offenders could be punished by death). 
 88. Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 345 
(1925) (citations omitted). 
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nations, . . . [they] shall, upon conviction thereof, . . . be punished with 
death.”89 
In the most important early piracy case, United States v. Smith,90 the 
Supreme Court relied extensively on international sources and international 
law in interpreting a domestic statute.91  The petitioner in the case, Thomas 
Smith, had been arrested and charged with piracy under the 1790 Act and 
the 1819 Act.92  Smith argued that Congress failed to properly exercise its 
power to punish piracy as authorized by the Constitution, which describes 
Congress’ power “to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on 
the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.”93  Smith argued that 
the two pieces of legislation passed by Congress pursuant to Article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution were overly vague.94  Specifically, he argued 
that both Acts failed to define piracy such that he could be successfully 
prosecuted for any such crimes.95 
Justice Story, writing for the Court, rejected Smith’s contention that 
piracy was not sufficiently defined and reasoned that because of the 
reference to common law in the former Act and the law of nations in the 
latter Act, piracy was thus defined with reasonable certainty under both 
Acts.96  Turning first to the 1790 Act, the Court determined that the Act’s 
language was wholly appropriate to the extent that it defined piracy by 
reference to common law terms.97  The Court held that “the crime is not 
less clearly ascertained than it would be by using the definitions of these 
terms as they are found in our treatises of the common law,” and that “[i]n 
fact, by such a reference, the definitions are necessarily included, as much 
as if they stood in the text of the act.”98 
Next, the Court considered the 1819 Act, which defined piracy not by 
reference to domestic law but rather by reference to the law of nations, or 
international law.99  This legislative step itself reflected a willingness by 
                                                          
 89. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of 
Piracy § 5.  
 90. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 154–55. 
 93. Id. at 158 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (restating the argument that Congress should not leave the definition of 
piracy to judicial interpretation). 
 96. Id. at 159–61. 
 97. See id. at 160 (noting that “robbery” and “murder” have well-understood common 
law meanings that carry over into the 1790 Act). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 160–62 (noting that the vast majority of scholars who wrote on the law of 
nations considered piracy a defined crime).  By contrast, in Palmer, perhaps because only 
the domestically focused 1790 Act had been passed, the Court did not begin to look at the 
relationship between the law of nations and domestic law or turn to external sources of law 
to interpret the nature of piracy.  See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 626–
27 (1818) (focusing only on the plain words of the 1790 Act). 
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American lawmakers to incorporate international law into domestic law.100  
By enacting legislation that specifically turned to international law to 
define piracy, Congress had opened the door for courts to rely on 
international law in piracy cases.101 
To determine whether the crime of piracy was defined by the law of 
nations with reasonable certainty, the Court in Smith also presented its first 
extensive discussion of the appropriate sources of international law.102  The 
Court relied heavily on international scholars to reach its final decision, 
noting the importance of these leading scholars as sources of applicable 
international law.103  The Court cited at length to Hugo Grotius, often 
considered the father of international law, and quoted directly from 
Grotius’s work in several pages of its original Latin.104  The Court also 
cited Italian jurist Domenico Alberto Azuni’s description of piracy as 
“justly regarded as a crime against the universal laws of society, and . . . 
every where punished with death” and cited Azuni’s proclamation that 
“every nation has a right to pursue, and exterminate them, without any 
declaration of war.”105  Finally, the Court cited Sir Leoline Jenkins for the 
guiding principle that pirates “are in the law hostes humani generis, 
enemies, not of one nation, or of one sort of people only, but of all 
mankind.”106  The Court concluded that all of these sources demonstrated 
that under the law of nations, the “true definition” of piracy is “robbery 
upon the sea.”107  That clear definition refuted Smith’s primary argument to 
the Court.108 
Having used international sources to identify a concrete definition of 
piracy, the Court returned to Smith’s arguments about the 1790 Act and 
                                                          
 100. The importance of the law of nations was recognized by many of the Founding 
Fathers.  Thomas Jefferson recognized that “[t]he Law of Nations, by which [a] question is 
to be determined, is composed of three branches. 1. the Moral law of our nature. 2. the 
Usages of nations. 3. their special Conventions.”  25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 609 
(John Catanzariti, ed., 1992).  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph stated that 
“[t]he law of nations, tho’ not specially adapted by the constitution, or any municipal act, is 
essentially a part of the law of the land.”  24 id. at 127. 
 101. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160–61 (referencing the law of nations as support 
for the Court’s holding). 
 102. See id. at 160–61 (stating that consulting “the general usage and practice of nations” 
was helpful to interpret the law of nations, and drawing comparisons to England’s piracy 
law). 
 103. See id. at 161–63 (emphasizing that virtually all scholars agreed that piracy was a 
defined crime). 
 104. See id. at 163–66 n.a (stressing that although Grotius did not expressly define piracy 
at any point in his writing, there was “no doubt” about how he construed the crime).   
 105. Id. at 167 n.a (quoting 2 M.D.A. AZUNI, THE MARITIME LAW OF EUROPE 361 
(William Johnson trans., 1806)). 
 106. Id. at 174 n.a (citing SIR LEOLINE JENKINS, 1 ADMIRALTY SESSIONS 86 (1668)). 
 107. Id. at 162 (asserting that the Court would have come to the same conclusion 
regardless of whether it had looked to common law, maritime, or law of nations scholars). 
 108. See id. (concluding with “no hesitation” that piracy was sufficiently defined). 
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noted that the law of nations is part of the common law109 and that, as a 
result, the common law definition of piracy incorporated the international 
law understanding of piracy “as an offence against the universal law of 
society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race.”110 
The manner in which modern courts determine what constitutes 
international law can be directly traced to the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Smith111 and its efforts to define piracy under the law of nations.112  The 
Smith Court reasoned that “[w]hat the law of nations on this subject is, may 
be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on 
public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by 
judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law.” 113  That statement 
of the sources of international law incorporates three of the primary sources 
of international law recognized by tribunals worldwide today as codified in 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.114  
In United States v. Furlong,115 a case decided less than one week after 
Smith, the Supreme Court considered several indictments from the circuit 
courts of Georgia and South Carolina involving prisoners of various 
nationalities and aboard ships cruising under flags both domestic and 
foreign, convicted for acts of piracy.116  The Court construed the 1790 Act 
to establish the principle that regardless of the nationality of the accused or 
the national character of the ship involved, piratical acts were punishable 
under the Act.117  The Court reasoned that “[r]obbery on the seas is 
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations.  It is 
against all, and punished by all.”118  The Court went on to explain that “a 
vessel, by assuming a piratical character, is no longer included in the 
                                                          
 109. See id. at 161 (recognizing, though, that the common law punishes piracy offenders 
as offenders against the law of nations). 
 110. Id.  The Court also noted that Blackstone considered the common law definition of 
piracy indistinguishable from the law of nations definition.  Id. at 162 (citing 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73). 
 111. Id. at 160–61. 
 112. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002), rehearing dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238–39 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that the Smith court articulated three 
different types of international law, including scholarly writings, general practices of 
nations, and judicial decision enforcing a law).  
 113. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160–61. 
 114. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 
(codifying four sources of international law:   (1) international conventions, (2) international 
custom, (3) general principles of law recognized by nations, and (4) judicial decisions and 
scholarly writings). 
 115. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
 116. Id. at 184. 
 117. See Id. at 193 (rejecting petitioners’ argument that section 5 of the 1819 Act 
essentially repealed section 8 of the 1790 Act and holding that both Acts remained 
applicable). 
 118. Id. at 197. 
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description of a foreign vessel.”119  The Court found that the crew in the 
case “assumed the character of pirates, whereby they lost all claim to 
national character or protection.”120 
Almost twenty-five years later, in Harmony v. United States,121 
shipowners appealed the seizure of their vessel in response to their alleged 
violations of the 1819 Act to punish the crime of piracy.122  Among their 
defenses, the shipowners argued that the “aggressions, restraints, and 
depredations” alleged were not “piratical” within the language of the 
Act.123  They also argued that, in order to establish piracy, the Act required 
the express intent to steal for the sake of gain and for no other purpose.124  
The Supreme Court ruled that such a narrow reading of the Act would 
defeat the purpose of the legislation, which it believed to be “designed to 
carry into effect the general law of nations on the same subject in a just and 
appropriate manner.”125  The Court interpreted “piratical” in this context to 
be general, including any aggression belonging to a class of behavior 
commonly attributed to pirates, regardless of their motives.126  Reaffirming 
the views expressed in Smith and Furlong, the Court noted that “a pirate is 
deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis.  But why is he so 
deemed?  Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of 
any or all nations, without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of 
public authority.”127  
B. Universal Jurisdiction 
Piracy cases reached their apex towards the end of the nineteenth 
century.  In the century that followed, federal courts decided only a handful 
of cases dealing with piracy.128  But the influence of the early piracy cases 
translated into important decisions in cases of a nonmaritime nature.  The 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 198. 
 120. Id. at 205. 
 121. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). 
 122. Id. at 231–33. 
 123. Id. at 230. 
 124. Id. at 232. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing 
charged offenses as piracy), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 324 (2008); Miller v. United States,  
88 F.2d 102, 103 (9th Cir. 1937) (noting that the defendants were charged with piracy); The 
Schooner “Experiment”, 49 Ct. Cl. 392 (1914) (relating to piracy in 1798); Ship  
Asia v. United States, 47 Ct. Cl. 189 (1912) (involving piracy in 1778); The Schooner 
Endeavor, 44 Ct. Cl. 242 (1909) (involving privateering in 1798); In re African-Am. Slave 
Descendents Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (listing charges against 
defendants to include piracy). 
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primary vehicle for this influence has been the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),129 
which has been modified several times since the first Congress passed its 
original version as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.130  Many of the 
modern ATS cases have directly analogized other crimes to piracy in order 
to persuade courts to assert jurisdiction over disputes with no connection to 
the United States.   
One of the first federal court cases to invoke the ATS involved an 
instance of alleged piracy.131  In Bolchos v. Darrel,132 a French privateer 
seized a Spanish slave ship that was mortgaged to a British mortgagee.133  
The court discussed the applicable law of nations principle that would 
require that neutral property be restored to its neutral owner.134  Ultimately, 
the court determined that a treaty with France required that “property of 
friends found on board the vessels of an enemy shall be forfeited” and 
accordingly, held that the slaves or money from their sale be returned to the 
French boat.135  Nevertheless, this case demonstrates the importance of 
piracy as a vehicle for the discussion and incorporation of international law 
principles in United States federal courts.  The case that revived the ATS as 
a mechanism to prosecute human rights violations, Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala,136 involved a lawsuit filed by the Filartigas, Paraguayan citizens, 
against Norberto Peña-Irala, another Paraguayan citizen in the United 
States on a visitor’s visa, for alleged torture and killing that took place 
entirely in Paraguay.137  The claim alleged that when the parties were living 
as neighbors in Paraguay, the defendant, a Paraguayan police official, 
                                                          
 129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”). 
 130. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, 77 (1789) (citation omitted) (providing 
that the new federal district courts “shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of 
the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues 
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 131. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810–11 (D.S.C. 1795).  Though described as a 
piracy case, Bolchos in fact involved privateering rather than piracy.  See ANGUS KONSTAM, 
PRIVATEERS AND PIRATES 1730–1830, at 3 (2001) (describing privateering as “a form of 
nationally sponsored piracy which reached its peak in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries.”).  Privateers receive letters of marque and reprisal, essentially licenses from their 
government to engage in what would otherwise be considered piracy.  See Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy:  Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 211 (2004).  In the United States, the right to grant letters of marque 
and reprisal is granted to Congress in the Constitution.  Id.  The abundant privateering cases 
in federal courts in the eighteenth century addressed many issues.  Most important for 
purposes of this Article, a handful of those cases addressed whether the entity that had 
issued the letter of marque and reprisal was a nation or otherwise empowered to issue such 
letters. 
 132. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). 
 133. Id. at 810–11. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 811. 
 136. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 137. See id. at 878 (filing suit while in the United States on a visitor’s visa). 
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kidnapped and tortured the Filartigas’s seventeen-year-old son in retaliation 
for his father’s outspoken opposition to the Paraguayan presidential 
regime.138  In finding jurisdiction under the ATS, the Second Circuit ruled 
that torture is universally regarded as repugnant, and therefore that the acts 
alleged would be violations of international law.139  The court concluded 
that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate 
and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.”140 
Since Filartiga, several cases have applied the analogy of human rights 
violators as hostis humani generis, similar to pirates, to justify the concept 
of universal jurisdiction in American jurisprudence.141  Universal 
jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over acts involving 
nationals of any nation that take place anywhere in the world, where those 
acts are sufficiently heinous.142  
The Second Circuit more clearly stated the application of universal 
jurisdiction beyond piracy in United States v. Yousef.143  In Yousef, the 
appellants appealed their convictions relating to a conspiracy to bomb U.S. 
commercial airliners in Southeast Asia and for their involvement in the 
February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City.144  
The appellants argued that the district court erred in holding that the 
universality principle provided jurisdiction over the bombing of a 
Philippine Airlines flight, flying between destinations outside of the United 
                                                          
 138. See id. at 876–79 (seeking ten million dollars in damages for wrongful death by 
torture in violation of international law, claiming jurisdiction under the general federal 
question provision and under the ATS). 
 139. Id. at 881–85. 
 140. Id. at 890. 
 141. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“The reference [in Filartiga] to piracy and slave-trading is not fortuitous.  Historically 
these offenses held a special place in the law of nations:   their perpetrators, dubbed enemies 
of all mankind, were susceptible to prosecution by any nation capturing them.”).  But see 
Kontorovich, supra note 131, at 183 (arguing that use of piracy as an analogy to justify 
universal jurisdiction for universally heinous offenses, such as human rights violations, is 
ill-conceived and historically flawed).  The discussion of the merits of drawing justification 
for the assertion of universal jurisdiction from piracy cases is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 142. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 304–05 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(emphasizing that universal jurisdiction “recognize[s] that international law permits any 
state to apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the state has no links of territory 
with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the victim)” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. A (1987))); Kontorovich, 
supra note 131, at 183 (suggesting that the doctrine allows any nation to prosecute universal 
offenses based solely on the “extraordinary heinousness” of the alleged human rights 
offense); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 323, 323–24 (2001) (asserting that though there may be debate over what offenses 
are subject to universal jurisdiction, it generally extends to slave trade, genocide, war 
crimes, and torture). 
 143. 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 144. Id. at 77–78.  
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States, with no evidence that any United States citizens were aboard or 
were targets of the bombing.145  The appellants argued that jurisdiction 
under the universality principle would be improper because terrorism is not 
universally condemned and, therefore, not subject to universal 
jurisdiction.146  Beginning its discussion of this issue, the court suggested 
that the concept of universal jurisdiction originated with piracy, which has 
been acknowledged as a crime for at least five hundred years.147  The court 
then discussed the limited situations to which the principle of universal 
jurisdiction had been applied, noting that its application to violations of 
international law other than piracy—specifically to crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and genocide—was a relatively new phenomenon of 
the post-World War II era.148  The court concluded that the historical 
restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity illustrates that customary international law allows for 
universal jurisdiction “only where crimes (1) are universally condemned by 
the community of nations, and (2) by their nature occur either outside of a 
State or where there is no State capable of punishing, or competent to 
punish, the crime (as in a time of war).”149 
The repeated analogy between piracy and universal jurisdiction, though 
not always successful, offers a reminder of the currency piracy has had in 
legal thought even during periods where crimes on the high seas were not 
making headlines.  More recently, in United States v. Shi,150 the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the conviction of a Chinese crew member who had seized 
                                                          
 145. See id. at 97 (noting that the jurisdictional issue was complicated because the 
airplane that was bombed was flying outside of the United States and no United States 
citizens were aboard the flight or targeted). 
 146. Id.  
 147. See id. at 104–05 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S (5. Wheat.) 153, 163 n.a 
(1820)) (highlighting that it is recognized as a crime against all nations “both because of the 
threat that piracy poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations and because the 
crime occurs statelessly on the high seas”). 
 148. See id. at 105 (citing Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), 
vacated, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993)) (noting specifically crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide); see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 572 (1995) (noting that until relatively recently, questions 
were raised about even the legality of applying universal jurisdiction in cases of war 
crimes).   
 149. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 105.  In agreeing with the appellants that no common consensus 
on the definition of terrorism exists, the court held that the application of universal 
jurisdiction was in error but found that other international bases of jurisdiction could be used 
to assert the court’s power over the appellants.  See id. at 106–10 (“We regrettably are no 
closer now than eighteen years ago to an international consensus on the definition of 
terrorism or even its proscription; the mere existence of the phrase ‘state-sponsored 
terrorism’ proves the absence of agreement on basic terms among a large number of 
States that terrorism violates public international law.  Moreover, there continues to be 
strenuous disagreement among States about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, 
nor have we shaken ourselves free of the cliché that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 150. 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 324 (2008). 
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control of a Taiwanese ship in international waters off the coast of 
Hawaii.151  The court evaluated the statute that codified the United States’ 
obligations under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and found that the statute was 
constitutional and applicable outside United States territory.152  The statute 
at issue required that the accused be found in the United States, and the 
court held that this requirement was met even though the defendant was 
brought into the country against his will.153   
The court explained that “[p]rosecuting piracy was the original rationale 
for creating universal jurisdiction.”154  The holding reaffirmed the notion 
that any state may generally prosecute a pirate,155 and in addressing the 
defendant’s constitutional arguments, the court explained that “[d]ue 
process does not require a nexus between such an offender and the United 
States because the universal condemnation of the offender’s conduct puts 
him on notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he is 
found.”156  
C. State Action 
Kadic v. Karadžić157 illustrates another way in which the early piracy 
cases influenced modern understandings of international law concepts.  
Specifically, the Second Circuit’s holdings in Kadic highlight two ways in 
which piracy cases influenced modern American legal doctrines concerning 
the requirement of state action in order to find a violation of the law of 
nations.158   
In Kadic, Croat and Muslim victims from Bosnia-Herzegovina filed 
claims in the Southern District of New York against Radovan Karadžić, the 
leader of the Serbian entity known as Republika Srpska during the civil war 
in Yugoslavia, for violations of international law under the ATS and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).159  The plaintiffs’ alleged that 
                                                          
 151. Id. at 718.  
 152. Id. at 719–22. 
 153. Id. at 725.  When the ship’s parent company did not hear from the ship for several 
days, it contacted the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard intercepted the ship.  Id. at 
718.  Subsequently, F.B.I. agents boarded the ship, arrested Shi, and transported him to the 
federal building in Honolulu.  Id. at 719.      
 154. Id. at 723. 
 155. See id. (stating that the trial of pirates by any state is a historically accepted practice 
in federal courts). 
 156. Id.  
 157. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 158. See id. at 236 (holding that the leader of insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces is not 
immune from service of process and may be tried in a U.S. District Court in Manhattan, 
highlighting his crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
 159. See id. (noting that Karadžić was the leader of the “self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb 
republic of ‘Srpska’” during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia).  The ATS is also 
known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and is so described in the Kadic opinions. 
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during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Karadžić was responsible for 
“genocide, rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and 
ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.”160   
The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the ATS, concluding that “acts committed by non-state 
actors do not violate the law of nations.”161  In reaching that conclusion, the 
district court found that, because Republika Srpska did not constitute a 
recognized state, Karadžić and his followers did not act under the color of 
any recognized state law.162  
On appeal, relying primarily on early piracy cases, the Second Circuit 
disagreed with the district court, finding instead that non-state actors can 
violate the law of nations.163  To support the conclusion that non-state 
actors can be held responsible for violations of the law of nations, the court 
referred to the early Supreme Court cases involving the prosecution of 
pirates164 as well as later prohibitions on the slave trade and certain war 
crimes.165  Having concluded that certain violations of international law do 
not require state action, the Second Circuit held that Karadžić could be 
tried as a private individual under the ATS for the alleged crimes of 
genocide,166 war crimes,167 and other instances of inflicting death, torture, 
and degrading treatment, so long as these alleged acts were in furtherance 
of genocide or war crimes.168  
Piracy also influenced a second part of the Second Circuit opinion.  
Despite holding that the law of nations could apply to non-state actors, the 
                                                          
 160. Id. at 237. 
 161. Id. (quoting Doe v. Karadžić, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub 
nom. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 162. See id. at 237–38 (citing Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 741).  Similarly, under the TVPA, the 
district court held that the absence of state action precluded the victims’ claims because the 
Act expressly requires that individual defendants act “under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation.”  Id. (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, §2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992)). 
 163. See id. at 239 (disagreeing with the notion that the “law of nations . . . confines its 
reach to state action” and instead holding that “certain forms of conduct,” regardless of 
whether it is private or state action, will violate the law of nations and citing piracy 
convictions as an “early example” of private action falling under this category). 
 164. Id. (citing Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); United 
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820)). 
 165. Id. (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1992); Jordan Paust, The Other Side of Right:  Private Duties Under 
Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992)). 
 166. See id. at 241–42 (emphasizing that state action is not necessary to hold a party in 
violation of genocide). 
 167. See id. at 242–43 (asserting that private individuals have been liable for war crimes 
since World War I). 
 168. See id. at 244, 251 (reversing the lower court dismissals and remanding for further 
proceedings consistent with these findings). 
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court went on to consider whether Republika Srpska qualified as a state for 
purposes of international law.169  Answering in the affirmative, the court 
found that the warring faction headed by Karadžić satisfied the definition 
of a state, reasoning: 
The definition of a state is well established in international law:  “Under 
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that 
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other 
such entities.”170 
The way in which this modern definition of a state under international 
law connects to piracy is not immediately apparent, but the basis for this 
understanding actually dates back to early piracy cases.  To determine 
whether Republika Srpska qualified as a State, the court looked to both 
international law and domestic law.  In its domestic law citations, the court 
lists Ford v. Surget,171 an 1878 Supreme Court case, whose facts do not 
involve piratical acts, but whose legal conclusions were influenced by prior 
cases that involved piracy and privateering.172   
Ford involved litigation over the capture or destruction of vessels during 
the Spanish civil war with its colonies and the U.S. Civil War.173  The case 
called on the Court to decide whether the acts were piratical, a question 
which in turn depended on whether the alleged wrongdoers were acting 
under the authority or commission of a de facto government.174 
Ford was a trespass action brought by one Mississippi resident against 
another in which Ford claimed that Surget unlawfully burned two hundred 
bales of his cotton.175  Surget argued that he was ordered to destroy the 
cotton by military commanders of the Confederate army in order to keep 
the cotton from falling into the hands of the Union army, and that he was 
therefore not liable for his actions.176  The Court held that Surget could not 
be held liable for the damage to Ford’s cotton.177  The Court emphasized 
the illegitimacy of the Confederate government and stated that “[t]here was 
no legislation of the Confederate congress which this court can recognize 
as having any validity against the United States.”178  However, the Court 
reasoned that “the Confederate army was . . . in the interest of humanity, 
                                                          
 169. See id. at 244 (noting that appellants sought to prove that Republika Srpska 
qualifies as a “state” and, in the alternative, that Karadžić acted in concert with Serbia). 
 170. Id. (citations omitted). 
 171. 97 U.S. 594 (1878). 
 172. Id. at 620.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 595. 
 176. Id. at 596. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 604. 
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and to prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation, [entitled to] such 
belligerent rights as belonged under the laws of nations to the armies of 
independent governments engaged in war against each other.”179   
The majority opinion in Ford focuses on the rights of belligerent entities 
without conceding that the Confederacy was a State in the international law 
sense of the term.180  However, more important to later developments in 
American law than the majority opinion in Ford is Justice Clifford’s 
concurrence in the case.181  Justice Clifford’s concurrence relied on 
previous privateering cases to explain the concepts of de facto government 
and belligerent rights.182  Justice Clifford used this analysis of belligerent 
rights to conclude that the Confederacy was a de facto government.183  
Justice Clifford explained that “[u]nless the Confederate States may be 
regarded as having constituted a de facto government for the time . . . , then 
the officers and seamen of their privateers and the officers and soldiers of 
their army were mere pirates and insurgents . . . .”184  Justice Clifford 
explained the undesirable implications of such a piracy designation and 
described that “every officer, seaman, or soldier who killed a Federal 
officer or soldier in battle, whether on land or the high seas, [would be] 
liable to indictment, conviction, and sentence for the crime of  
murder . . . .”185  He stated that despite the Confederacy’s “violation of the 
Constitution and the acts of Congress . . . it cannot be denied . . . [that] a 
government in fact was erected.”186   
Justice Clifford’s concurrence draws heavily on a series of cases that 
arose in the early nineteenth century in which courts had occasion to 
consider issues involving the nature of belligerent states. 187  Five cases 
                                                          
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Later cases addressing issues of statehood and the Act of State doctrine rely upon 
Justice Clifford’s concurrence.  See Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d 
168 U.S. 250 (1897).  Underhill is widely regarded as the entry of the Act of State doctrine 
in U.S. jurisprudence.  The Court extended the doctrine beyond the sovereign state, stating:   
Upon principle, it cannot be important whether the acts of military authorities, when 
called in question, are done by the authority of a de jure or titular, or of a de facto, 
government.  In either case, if they are done in the legitimate exercise of belligerent 
powers, they are not ordinarily attended with civil responsibility.  This principle has 
been recognized by the supreme court of the United States in cases in which the civil 
liability of Confederate soldiers for acts done, as members of the insurgent forces, 
during the Rebellion, was under consideration. 
Id. at 582 (citing Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405 (1889); Ford, 97 U.S. at 594). 
 182. Ford, 97 U.S. at 608–23 (Clifford, J., concurring).   
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 623. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 616. 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643–44 (1820) (“[W]hen 
a civil war rages in a foreign nation, one part of which separates itself from the old 
established government, and erects itself into a distinct government, the courts of the Union 
must view such newly-constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative and 
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referenced in Justice Clifford’s concurrence—three from the U.S. Supreme 
Court and two cases issued by the highest courts of Maine and 
Pennsylvania, respectively—merit particular attention. 
In The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad,188 the Supreme Court settled an 
issue arising from the War of 1812, when a United States privateer 
captured cargo believed to be British and returned to North Carolina to 
institute prize claims.189  However, the cargo had in fact been taken from a 
vessel commissioned by the Province of Carthagena, a Spanish colony at 
war with Spain, which had captured the cargo as prize from a Spanish 
vessel.190 
In deciding the fate of the cargo, the court considered the validity of the 
commission granted by Carthagena.191  Recognizing that the war between 
Spain and its colonies was acknowledged by the U.S. government and that 
Carthagena had its own organized government, the court held it is the duty 
of the courts in the United States:  
where a capture is made by either of the belligerent parties, without any 
violation of our neutrality, and the captured prize is brought innocently 
with our jurisdiction, to leave things in the same state they find them; or 
to restore them to the state from which they have been forcibly removed 
by the act of our own citizens.192 
Similarly, in The Santissima Trinidad,193 the Supreme Court considered 
a libel claim filed by the consul of Spain on behalf of Spanish shipowners 
in the District Court of Virginia for the loss of cargo captured by vessels 
belonging to the government of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata 
(modern-day Argentina).194  The suit alleged, in part, that the capturing 
                                                          
executive departments of the government of the United States.  If the government of the 
Union remains neutral, but recognises the existence of a civil war, the courts of the Union 
cannot consider as criminal, those acts of hostility, which war authorizes, and which the new 
government may direct against its enemy.”); United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 
144, 149 (1820) (holding that a purported commission from an unrecognized territory of the 
Mexican Republic was invalid and thus robbery of a Danish vessel was piratical, and 
stating, “[s]o far as this Court can take any cognizance of that fact, [the purported Brigadier 
of the Mexican Republic] can have no power, either as Brigadier of the Mexican Republic, a 
republic of whose existence we know nothing, or as Generalissimo of the Floridas, a 
province in the possession of Spain, to issue commissions to authorize private or public 
vessels to make captures at sea”); see also Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 
(1822) (analyzing the difference between piracy and privateering in the context of 
commissions granted by belligerent Spanish colonies during the Spanish civil war with its 
colonies); The Nueva Anna, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 193 (1821) (same); The Josefa Segunda, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338 (1820) (same); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819) 
(same); The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 497 (1819) (same).  
 188. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 497 (1819). 
 189. Id. at 499. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 501–02. 
 192. Id. at 497. 
 193. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822). 
 194. Id. at 284–85. 
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vessels did not deserve the privileges and immunities afforded to public 
ships of sovereign states because the government of the United Provinces 
of Rio de la Plata had not yet been recognized as a sovereign government 
by either the executive or legislative branches of the United States.195  To 
this claim, the Court replied: 
We have, in former cases, had occasion to express our opinion on this 
point.  The government of the United States has recognized the existence 
of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has avowed a 
determination to remain neutral between the parties, and to allow to each 
the same rights of asylum and hospitality and intercourse.  Each party is, 
therefore, deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns 
us, the sovereign rights of war, and entitled to be respected in the 
exercise of those rights.  We cannot interfere to the prejudice of either 
belligerent without making ourselves a party to the contest, and 
departing from the posture of neutrality.196 
In Mauran v. Ins. Co.,197 the Supreme Court analyzed whether naval 
forces of the Confederate states that seized a vessel near the mouth of the 
Mississippi River were to be considered pirates for purposes of the vessel’s 
insurance policy.198  The policy covered capture by pirates and thieves.199  
Like the majority opinion in Ford, the Court in Mauran emphasized  
that the actions of the Confederate states were “unlawful and 
unconstitutional.”200  Nonetheless, the Court held that the “so-called 
Confederate States were in the possession of many of the highest attributes 
of government, sufficiently so to be regarded as the ruling or supreme 
power of the country.”201  Thus, the Court held that the capture was not 
piratical and therefore not covered by the insurance policy.202   
Justice Clifford’s concurrence also cites two relevant state court 
opinions.  In Dole v. Merchants’ Mutual Marine Insurance Co.,203 
involving a ship commissioned by the Confederacy, the Supreme Court of 
Maine explained that “every forcible contest between two governments,  
de facto, or de jure, is war.  War is an existing fact, and not a legislative 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 337. 
 196. Id.  
 197. 73 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1867).   
 198. Id. at 1.  The Court in Mauran also relied on Spanish-American cases for the 
proposition that “if the captors represented a de facto authority recognized by the Executive 
of the United States, they were not pirates by the law of nations.”  Id. at 5 (emphasis in 
original) (citing The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); The Nueva Anna, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 193 (1821); The Josefa Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338 (1820); The 
Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819); Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 497 (1819); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818)). 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. at 14. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 51 Me. 465 (1863). 
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decree.”204  The court went on to reason that in this instance “[h]ostile 
forces, each representing a de facto government, were arrayed against each 
other, in actual conflict.  Its existence would not have been more palpable 
or real, if it had been recognized by any legislative action.”205 
Finally, in Fifield v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania,206 the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed a claim filed by shipowners to 
recover losses incurred when their ship was captured by a privateer 
commissioned by the Confederate states.207  The policy insured the ship 
and its cargo against losses from “pirates, rovers, and assailing thieves” but 
excluded losses from capture.208  The court reasoned that the Confederate 
States were recognized by the “history of the times” as a de facto 
government, and the capture made by the Confederate vessel was not 
piratical but rather a capture under the laws of war.209 
These confederate-era insurance claim cases rely on early nineteenth 
century cases that differentiated between piracy and privateering.210  As the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described it, the distinction between 
privateering and piracy is that privateering involves “captures jure belli 
under colour of governmental authority and for the benefit of a political 
power organized as a government de jure or de facto,” while piracy is 
“mere robbery on the high seas committed from motives of personal gain, 
like theft or robbery on land.”211  Privateering had “been claimed and 
                                                          
 204. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original). 
 205. Id. at 478. 
 206. 47 Pa. 166 (1864). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 174. 
 209. Id. at 170–74. 
 210. See generally Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 223 (1844) 
(discussing the different liability implications for each). 
 211. Fifield, 47 Pa. at 169.  Privateering was officially abolished by the “principal 
maritime powers of Europe” at the Congress of Paris in 1856.  Id.  The United States did not 
accede to the declaration, and “[a]s late as . . . March 1863, Congress authorized the 
President to issue letters of marque and reprisal ‘in all domestic and foreign wars.’”  Id.; see 
also An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, Prices, and Prize Goods, 12 Stat. 758 (1863).  
The United States’ failure to accede to the declaration is interesting given that it had pushed 
for abolishing privateering in prior decades.  In 1785, Benjamin Franklin said,  
It is high time for the sake of Humanity that a Stop be put to this Enormity.  The 
United States of America, tho’ better situated than any European Nation to make 
Profit by Privateering . . . are, as far as in them lies, endeavouring to abolish the 
Practice . . . . This will be a happy Improvement of the Law of Nations.   
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 1, 1785), available at 
http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (follow “1784–85” hyperlink; 
then follow “To Benjamin Vaughan (unpublished)” hyperlink).  In 1823, John Quincy 
Adams cited Franklin’s letter and stated that “[p]rivate war, banished by the tacit and 
general consent of Christian nations from their territories, has taken its last refuge upon the 
ocean, and there continues to disgrace and afflict them by a system of licensed robbery, 
bearing all the most atrocious characters of piracy.”  Letter of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush (July 
28, 1823), in PRESIDENT MONROE’S INSTRUCTIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 33-111, at 6 (1854).  The 
U.S. Constitution, however, provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
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defended as lawful warfare on public enemies.  It is the substitute for 
enormous naval establishments.”212  
One additional case also used piracy as defined by the law of nations to 
address and resolve disputes over seizures of ships during times of war.  In 
1885, United States v. The Ambrose Light213 presented the question of 
whether hostile insurgents who had captured a ship were actually at war 
with the nation of Colombia.  In that case, the ship’s capturers claimed to 
have been commissioned by the insurgent group, while Colombia argued 
that the insurgent group was not recognized by any nation, and was 
therefore without a valid commission and engaging in piratical acts.214  The 
court relied on international law and reasoned that “depredating on the high 
seas without being authorized by any sovereign state” is piracy by the law 
of nations.215  The court noted that according to the general principles of 
international law, “[r]ebels who have never obtained recognition from any 
other power are clearly not a sovereign state in the eye of international law, 
and their vessels sent out to commit violence on the high seas are therefore 
piratical.”216  The court then went on to state: 
From these principles it necessarily follows that in the absence of 
recognition by any government of their belligerent rights, . . . that in 
blockading ports which all nations are entitled to enter, they attack the 
rights of all mankind, and menace with destruction the lives and property 
of all who resist their unlawful acts . . . .217   
                                                          
Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning 
Captures on Land and Water.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Despite this explicit constitutional 
language granting Congress the right to issue letters of marque, and therefore to commission 
privateers, the Government gave another reason for its refusal to accede to the Declaration 
of Paris in 1856.  Then Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, explained that “[t]he right of a 
commercial State, when unhappily involved in war, to employ its mercantile marine for 
defence and aggression, has heretofore proved to be an essential aid in checking the 
domination of a belligerent possessed of a powerful navy.”  Letter from Mr. Marcy to Mr. 
Siebels (July 14, 1856), in MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 
34-104 (1856).  By way of demonstration of the United States’ continued refusal to sign on 
to the Declaration of Paris during the Civil War era, in an 1861 letter from the U.S. 
Secretary of State to the European powers, the Secretary explains that the United States 
wanted an “amendment which should exempt the private property of individuals, though 
belonging to belligerent States, from seizure or confiscation by national vessels in maritime 
war.”  Letter from Mr. Seward to the European Powers (April 24, 1861), in LIST OF PAPERS 
RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 37-1/2, at 34–36 (1861).  
 212. Fifield, 47 Pa. at 169.  The use of privateering was especially important to the 
United States in its early history because the Continental Navy developed slowly.  2 LEGAL 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 353 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (“[P]rivateers, 
vessels fitted out at private expense and commissioned by Congress or a colony to sail 
against enemy shipping, were the substitute upon which the colonists chiefly had to rely.”). 
 213. 25 F. 408, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). 
 214. Id. at 412. 
 215. Id. (quoting Dana’s Wheat. Int. Law, § 122). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 412–13. 
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The court then concluded that the insurgents were in fact recognized 
belligerents and that their acts were therefore not piratical.218   
The piracy and privateering cases of the nineteenth century helped to 
develop federal law on state action, while taking account of international 
law along the way.  Courts expanded their understanding of the legal status 
of de facto states and clarified the definition of state actors through analogy 
to piracy cases, applying the reasoning in these cases to an entirely 
different context more than a century later.   
CONCLUSION 
Every century or so, it seems that the world is surprised when piracy 
rears its head; and so, accordingly, the recent wave of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia, in the Straits of Malacca and elsewhere has been treated as a 
novel event.219  Interestingly, some eighty-five years ago, writing in the 
Harvard Law Review, Edwin Dickinson, a leading international law scholar 
of his generation, noted: 
A few years ago it might have been surmised that in America . . . piracy 
had passed from the law in reserve into the law in history.  The important 
cases were nearly all one hundred years old or more.  It was commonly 
supposed that the seas were policed effectively. . . .  [R]ecent events, 
however, . . . challenge the assumption that the law of piracy is chiefly of 
historical significance.220 
Dickinson’s observation serves as a stark reminder that piracy knows no 
boundaries of time or space.   
Moreover, the influence of piracy on American law offers additional 
currency to a discussion of its modern-day relevance.  Undoubtedly, neither 
Norberto Peña-Irala nor Radovan Karadžić considered himself a pirate.  
Peña-Irala was inspector general of police in Asuncion, Paraguay when he 
oversaw the torture of Joelito Filartiga.221  Karadžić was the leader of the 
Bosnian Serbs from 1992 to 1995 during the break-up of the former 
                                                          
 218. See id. at 446.   
 219. See Fokas, supra note 13, at 428 (1997) (“Recent events belie the notion that 
maritime piracy is limited to historical interest.  A new breed of buccaneers is emerging to 
threaten the passage of ships across the world’s oceans.”); Eric Ellen, Governments Should 
Act Against Maritime Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/22/opinion/22iht-
ederic.t.html?scp=10&sq=resurgence%20piracy&st=cse (issuing the warning:  “The age-old 
scourge of piracy threatens shipping in Southeast Asian waters.  All vessels, including large 
cargo ships, should be on the alert.”). 
 220. Dickinson, supra note 88, at 334. 
 221. Nora Boustany, For a Sister, Court Fight Stirs Memories of Paraguay, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 2, 2004, at A22. 
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Yugoslavia when troops under his command engaged in mass rape, torture 
and ethnic cleansing.222 
Years after the alleged crimes, each man faced civil trials in the United 
States for his actions.223  The law of piracy did not feature prominently in 
either trial.  Nevertheless, the cases hinged on a body of American law that 
had been profoundly affected by legislative and judicial efforts to combat 
piracy more than a century earlier.  
Those who have followed closely the cases against Peña-Irala and 
Karadžić might have expected to learn from this Article that the two cases 
were linked to piracy through the ATS, which provided the legal basis for 
the civil claims made against the defendants in U.S. courts.  After all, 
piracy is one of the three enumerated bases for jurisdiction under the ATS 
as recognized by the Supreme Court.224   
However, the legislative history of the ATS seems to demonstrate that 
piracy was not a significant consideration animating the drafters of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.  Instead, the drafters seemed motivated by scandals 
involving foreign government officials.225  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,226 
                                                          
 222. John Sullivan, Bosnian Woman, Describing War Ordeal, Faints in U.S. Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at A3. 
 223. In the Karadžić action, the Doe Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 11, 
1993, and the Kadic Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 2, 1993.  Doe v. Karadžić, 866 
F.Supp. 734, 735–36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d 
Cir. 1995).  Peña-Irala was served with a complaint on April 6, 1979, while he was being 
held at the Brooklyn Navy Yard awaiting deportation after the Plaintiff alerted the INS that 
he was present in New York and his visa had expired.  Appellant’s Brief at 3, Filartiga v. 
Peña-Irala, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. Jul. 25, 1979); Defendant-Appellee Brief in Support of 
Judgment of Dismissal at 1, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. Sep. 19, 1979). 
 224. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–99 (2004).  In light of an 
increasing number of international human rights cases relying on the Alien Tort Statute, in 
2004 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the purpose and scope of that statute.  In Sosa, 
the Supreme Court addressed the question of the viability of the statute in an era of 
expanding international law.  Specifically, the Court faced the question of whether an 
allegedly wrongful arrest and detention amounted to a tort in violation of international law, 
ultimately concluding that “although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new 
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was 
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.  The jurisdictional grant is best 
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a 
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for 
personal liability at the time.”  Id. at 724.  This conclusion was based on two inferences the 
Court made after reviewing the historic context in which the ATS was originally drafted.  
First, the Court adopted the proposition that the first Congress did not pass the ATS as a 
“jurisdictional convenience” awaiting future causes of action to be created by Congress or 
state legislatures for the benefit of foreigners in light of the historic record.  Id. at 719.   
Second, the Court drew the inference “that Congress intended the ATS to furnish 
jurisdiction for” a small “set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations” that were 
definite and actionable at the time of the drafting of the ATS in 1789.  Id. at 720.  The Court 
concluded that Congress had focused primarily on offenses against ambassadors, while 
violations of safe conduct and individual actions arising out of prize captures may have also 
been contemplated.  See id.  
 225. Most frequently discussed is a well-publicized event involving threats and an 
assault on Francis Barbe Marbois, the Consul General of France to the United States 
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the Court adopted the majority view of modern scholars that the ATS grew 
out of events that occurred in the years prior to the passage of the Judiciary 
Act, which exposed the inability of the federal government to vindicate 
violations of the law of nations.227  
The Framers of the Constitution responded to these deficiencies in the 
system by vesting original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over “all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls.”228  The 
                                                          
residing in Philadelphia, by another Frenchman, De Longchamps.  See William R. Casto, 
The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law 
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 492 n.142 (1986) (listing many prominent political 
figures who discussed this affair in their correspondence to emphasize its notoriety at time 
when the Judiciary Act was being discussed in Congress).  Facing international scrutiny, 
Congress only had the power to offer a reward for the apprehension of De Longchamps and 
was later limited to passing a resolution approving his trial in a Pennsylvania court.  See id. 
at 491–93.  Although De Longchamps was eventually convicted “of a crime against the 
whole world,” in a Pennsylvania court, the affair raised serious foreign relations concerns to 
Congressional lawmakers that the federal government lacked the ability to provide redress 
for certain violations of the law of nations.  Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116 
(1784).  De Longchamps was fined 100 French crowns and sentenced to just over two years 
in prison.  Id. at 118; see also Casto, supra, at 493 n.146 (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1784), in 7 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288, 
289 (J. Boyd ed., 1953) (“[T]he . . . state is so indecisive . . . .  They have not yet declared 
what they can or will do. . . .  The affair is represented to Congress who will have the will 
but not the power to interpose.  It will probably go next to France and bring on serious 
consequences . . . .”). 
Several years later, during the ratification process following the Constitutional Convention, 
a similar international affair occurred involving the infringement of the rights of Dutch 
Ambassador Van Berckel in New York, where a constable entered his home to arrest one of 
his servants.  Despite a call for action by the Ambassador, the national government was 
wholly unable to provide a remedy for the incident.  Eventually, a state court in New York 
brought the constable to trial and found him guilty for a violation of the law of nations as 
adopted by the common law.  See Casto, supra, at 494 n.152 (quoting Report of Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs on complaint of Minister of United Netherlands (Mar. 25, 1788), 
reprinted in 34 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 109, 111 (1788) (“[T]hat the 
federal Government does not appear . . . to be vested with any judicial Powers competent to 
the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases. . . .”). 
 226. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 227. See Casto, supra note 225, at 492 n.142 (relying heavily upon the Supreme Court in 
framing its views of the ATS and providing exhaustive study of historic origins of the ATS 
to determine both its purpose and roots).  The scholarly debate on the roots of the ATS has 
provoked an active literature, in large measure because legislative history of the ATS is 
sparse, leaving scholars ample berth to dissect contemporaneous events and statements in 
search of inferences that may prove impossible to definitely prove.  William Dodge, for 
example, argued that the original intent of the ATS was to provide a “broad civil remedy for 
violations of the law of nations that the Continental Congress had sought since 1781,” by 
creating jurisdiction in district courts over tort actions, already cognizable in the common 
law, in violation of either the law of nations or a treaty to which the United States was 
bound.  William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute:   A Response to 
the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237 (1996).  But cf. Joseph 
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 445, 446 (1995) (arguing that the bonding of the words “tort” and “only” in 
ATS in reference to violations of law of nations, as well as a study of eighteenth century 
maritime prize law, demonstrates that the ATS was designed to provide jurisdiction over a 
subcategory of prize cases and only in instances where the legality of prize was not at issue). 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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First Congress under the Constitution subsequently drafted the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which established the ATS, reinforced the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction over suits brought by diplomats, and created alienage 
jurisdiction.229  The inclusion of piracy on the list may simply be 
attributable to the fact that William Blackstone listed piracy as one of three 
co-equal offenses against the law of nations that were eventually included 
in the ATS.230   
Even if the ATS could be more clearly linked to piracy, the connection 
between piracy and these modern civil cases is far stronger and more 
pervasive than any single statute.  Piracy has been the basis for the 
adoption of both sources and principles of international law.  Legal 
doctrines on universal jurisdiction and state action developed both directly 
and indirectly from cases involving piracy.  Moreover, through Smith, the 
Supreme Court recognized that international sources, such as the teachings 
of foreign scholars, could be used in American courts to determine the 
meaning of American laws.231   
Much like the case law of the nineteenth century, the eighteenth century 
legislation of the states demonstrates the unique role that piracy played in 
the development of the legal system in the new Republic.  From creating 
special courts to try pirates to enacting laws to differentiate among 
maritime crimes, state legislatures, like Congress, sought to create systems 
of laws to resolve the unique problems posed by piracy.  Those efforts led 
not only to the ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789 but also to the Act of 
1790—early efforts to address piracy at the federal level.  Only when 
courts and the legislature turned to the law of nations did the American 
legal system pick up the tailwind that eventually led to expansion of legal 
doctrines as varied as the power of courts over foreign nationals and the 
legitimacy of self-proclaimed states and state actors.   
Though obscured by passage of time and dearth of cases, American 
jurisprudence relating to piracy has played a significant role in the 
                                                          
 229. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717 (2004) (citing Kenneth C. Randall, 
Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:   Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 
18 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 15–21 (1985)); see also Dodge, supra note 227, at 237 
(noting that Congress intended to provide federal remedies for such violation in order to 
“protect against the vagaries of state law, the hostility of state courts, and differences in their 
interpretations of the law of nations, sparing the new nation the sort of embarrassment that 
had attended the Marbois affair.”). 
 230. Although the Court acknowledged that it was unsure of Congress’ intent in 
including piracy and violations of safe conduct in the ATS, it noted that in the leading 
treatise of the time, Blackstone listed all three offenses as co-equal torts in violation of the 
law of nations.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *68 
(“The principal offenses against the law of nations, animadverted on as such by the 
municipal laws of England, are of three kinds:  1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. 
Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3. Piracy.”). 
 231. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820). 
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development of American legal doctrines on all of these issues.  So, even as 
the rise in piracy cases presents modern problems, it also serves as an 
important reminder of the role that piracy has already played in the 
development of law in the United States—and can play in developing new 
legal doctrines. 
 
